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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we examine the emerging politics of labour agency as new manufacturing locations are
incorporated into existing global production networks, using the example of the Ethiopian apparel indus-
try. The Ethiopian state has employed an active space-based industrial policy to attract leading apparel
manufacturers into a series of new industrial parks in the country. Both investors and the Ethiopian gov-
ernment expected to find a large and pliant labour force willing to work for low wages. However, the new
sector has already seen a wave of collective and individual resistance from workers. We ask which factors
contribute to drive and constrain labour agency and shape the specific forms it takes in firms tied into
leading global production networks. Drawing on a large-N quantitative survey of factory workers and
in-depth qualitative interviews with managers, workers, trade union representatives and government
officials, we show how the quality of industrial relations depends not just on state action and the business
strategies of lead firms in production networks, but also on variegated forms of labour agency used both
by organised and unorganised Ethiopian workers. We find that many industrial conflicts result from the
collision of the productivity imperatives of manufacturing firms tied into demanding, but low value-
added, segments of global production networks with the expectations of workers with limited prior expe-
rience in industrial jobs, but are compounded by the contradictory actions of different state agencies, a
lack of formal unionisation, and the contingent interactions of factory based grievances with local polit-
ical conflicts. Industrial parks emerge as spaces of particular contestation. Our findings highlight the need
to adopt an understanding of labour regimes grounded in local political realities. These findings have
implications for the design of industrial policies and labour market institutions aiming to support firms
and workers in emerging manufacturing clusters.
 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Global manufacturing is increasingly organised via relation-
ships between suppliers and transnational lead firms who organise
where and under what conditions production takes. These rela-
tionships, variously described as global value chains (GVCs) or glo-
bal production networks (GPNs), create opportunities and
challenges for firms and workers in low-income countries (Hess,
2009). Firms might benefit from access to overseas markets, while
workers might benefit from increased employment opportunities.
However, these networks are characterised by asymmetric power
relations between lead firms and suppliers which constrain their
developmental potential (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005;
Yeung & Coe, 2015). Supplier firms in many low- and middle-
income countries are seeing their mark-ups squeezed as lead firms
capture the benefits resulting from lower production costs
(Selwyn, 2019; World Bank, 2020). Outcomes for workers therefore
depend on the conditions of their inclusion into global production
networks, and the agency of workers inside and outside the work-
place plays an important role in shaping conditions in supplier
firms (Coe, 2013). In the workplace such agency comprises both
compliance with and resistance to management strategies
(Taylor et al., 2015), while in the wider political sphere the balance
of power between workers and employers influences the institu-
tional norms that govern interactions between the state, labour
and capital (Selwyn, 2013).
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In this paper we ask what factors drive labour conflict and
worker resistance in new export manufacturing sectors and what
implications such conflicts have for working conditions. To address
these research questions we illustrate the dynamics of encounters
between international firms and local workers and the contingent
nature of outcomes for workers with an analysis of the apparel sec-
tor in Ethiopia, which offers a case study into the establishment of
a new export-oriented manufacturing industry. Ethiopia has
embarked on an ambitious industrialisation strategy centred
around an active industrial policy aiming to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI). For Ethiopian policy elites attracting such FDI
is a political necessity. It can help overcome constraints on indus-
trialisation in a context where domestic capitalists have limited
access to capital and capabilities, which hampers their ability to
compete in international markets. At the same time, inflows of
export-oriented FDI can help address balance of payment con-
straints (Cramer et al., 2020), while new manufacturing jobs pro-
vide employment for a rapidly growing labour force.
To streamline service provision and attract a new industrial
labour force, the apparel industry in Ethiopia is concentrated in a ser-
ies of industrial parks (Whitfield, Staritz, &Morris, 2020;Whitfield &
Staritz, 2020). Establishing such a labour force is a necessary
condition of sustained access to the global production networks that
structure the sector, but building an industrial workforce is an
uneven, conflictive and slow process (Thompson, 1967). The Ethio-
pian state is engaged in constructing a national labour regime that
can support insertion into demanding global production networks
by regulating the labour market, employment relations, and the
institutions of collective representation. This process is, however,
co-constituted in important ways by workers, who gain access to
new avenues for exercising their agency (Selwyn, 2012).
Understanding labour relations at the factory level requires a
combination of different layers of analysis, from the macro-
political economy of growth in the country, through the sector
and global production network level, to the micro-level of capital-
labour encounters in the workplace. To capture these factors and
their interactions, we combine a quantitative large-N survey of fac-
tory workers with in-depth qualitative interviews with managers,
workers, trade union representatives and government officials.
We show how labour relations are not simply determined by the
strategies of lead firms and their suppliers, but also depend on
state-level regulations and responses by organised and unorganised
labour.We find that labour conflict, particularly in the form of wild-
cat strikes, was more common in industrial parks, which host
mostly foreign firms and have low levels of unionisation. The inci-
dence of conflict varied significantly among firms within parks,
with internationally recognised companies being more affected
than smaller and less visible firms. This variation is driven in part
by localised political conflicts. The acceleration of strikes and labour
mobilisation coincided with a tumultuous period of political ten-
sions and protests that began in 2014. The targeting of high-
profile factories appears to boost the visibility of regional and local
opposition groups. However, despite these entanglements, genuine
labour grievances were at the heart of labour conflicts. Local polit-
ical mobilisation provided an opportunity to make these strikes
more effective. Our analysis further suggests that, although strikes
are common, ‘exit’ is a far more widespread form of resistance. Exit
manifested in high rates of absenteeism and turnover, particularly
for workers in their first three months into the job.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature in three ways.
First, we provide new empirical evidence on labour outcomes
and worker agency in a country which only recently entered appa-
rel GPNs controlled by global buyers. With the partial exception of
Bangladesh (see Anner, 2020; Saxena, 2019; Kabeer et al., 2020),
empirical evidence on labour dynamics within GPNs is still thin,
and especially so for ‘late-late comers’ like Ethiopia. Second, while
research on labour agency in GPNs tends to focus on formal organ-
isations such as trade unions (Cumbers et al., 2008), we offer evi-
dence on forms of resistance not mediated by unions, such as
wildcat strikes and high turnover, which are important features
of the Ethiopian context (Hardy & Hauge, 2019). Third, we demon-
strate the importance of considering local politics and political
conflicts for both the timing and targeting of labour resistance.
Dominant narratives about low-income countries stress how plen-
tiful supplies of labour, a supposedly docile labour force comprised
of women with limited employment experience, and the stability
that industrial jobs offer should dampen industrial strife. However,
in new centres of production workplace encounters are expected to
eventually produce new waves of resistance (Qi & Pringle, 2019;
Silver, 2003). Ethiopia is of particular interest in this regard as con-
flict arose in the very early stages of global capital penetration,
albeit with significant variation across firms. Understanding this
variation requires taking local political dynamics into account.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2
proposes a theoretical framework to analyse labour outcomes
within distinct labour regimes shaped by global, national and local
forces. This section also briefly lays out how we collected our data.
Section 3 provides the necessary background to understand capital,
the state and labour in the emerging apparel industry in Ethiopia.
Section 4 contains the primary empirical material on the dynamics
of labour conflict and resistance with regard to strikes and con-
straints on collective action, the role played by localised political
conflict, and struggles over effort and mobility. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2. Analysing labour conflict and variegated labour regimes:
Theory and data
Labour relations in the Ethiopian apparel export sector have
undergone rapid transformations with the arrival of new foreign
investments linked into global production networks organised by
global buyers. To analyse these dynamics, we draw on labour pro-
cess theory, mobilisation theory and GPN analysis. We use the con-
cept of labour regimes as a heuristic tool to explore how
interconnections between factors inside and outside the factory
help explain differences across workplaces. This concept stems
from work on the politics of production (Burawoy, 1985; Lee,
1999) which connects workplace labour relations with the
macro-politics of capital–labour relations in a national or global
context. Labour regimes build on labour process theory to frame
the interrelations of labour market segmentation and workforce
mobilisation, conditions of employment, and forms of enterprise
authority and control for the appropriation of surplus value
(Bernstein, 2007; Thompson, 1989). Employers and managers are
under permanent tension between manufacturing consent, i.e. cre-
ating internal labour markets that provide some stability to their
workforce, and exercising coercion to ensure work effort matches
productivity and quality imperatives (Burawoy, 1979; Collinson
& Ackroyd, 2006). Beyond the workplace, labour regimes incorpo-
rate the institutions of social reproduction which ensure that
workers can be mobilised, motivated, utilised in production, and
reproduced (Lerche et al., 2017; Taylor & Rioux, 2018). In this
sense, labour regime analysis is ‘‘necessarily multi-scalar”, incor-
porating the global, national, and local (Selwyn, 2016). The associ-
ated concept of labour control regimes emphasizes the role of
local/national labour institutions and the different sources of disci-
plining labour, whether governments, labour market conditions or
employers (Jonas, 1996; Anner, 2015; Pattenden, 2016; Smith
et al., 2018; Coe, 2015). At all levels labour regimes are co-
constituted by the actions of workers and their collective organisa-
tions. The extent to which workers engage in struggles, and the
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strategies they employ, influence and are influenced by the balance
of power between capital and labour (Selwyn, 2012) as well as
broader social relations such as ethnicity and gender (Barnes,
Krishna, & Pratap, 2016; Mezzadri, 2016), all of which impact the
organisation of GPNs.
To understand our central research problem, i.e. labour conflict
and resistance in the emerging apparel sector, we conceptualise
labour regimes in the dialectic of structure and agency (Van der
Linden, 2008; Wright, 2000; Atzeni, 2009). Particularly relevant to
this line of inquiry are Ohlin-Wright’s concepts of structural and
associational power (Ohlin-Wright, 2000), which have influenced
work on labour relations in a wide range of contexts (see for
instance Rizzo & Atzeni, 2020). Associational power flows from
the organisation of workers into collective bodies. Structural power
can be subdivided into workplace and marketplace power (Silver,
2003). The former describes power resulting from workers’ strate-
gic place in particular production processes and their ability to dis-
rupt activities further along the chain, while the latter stems from
tight labour markets which impede the ability of firms to replace
workers. There are different forms of labour mobilisation and resis-
tance, and their occurrence relates to different combinations of
workplace andmarketplace structural power, aswell as perceptions
of ‘injustice’ and ‘opportunity’, following Kelly’s work on mobilisa-
tion theory (Kelly, 1998). These concepts help explain what triggers
workers’ action, whether suchmobilisations reflect labour-process-
generated solidarity (Atzeni, 2009), and how contingent opportu-
nity factors enhance workers’ structural power.1 In cases where
there is no open conflict, such as strikes, workers can still exert pres-
sure that may impact aspects of the dominant labour regime. Smith
(2006) has suggested that work contracts contain two types of labour
indeterminacy and stressed the importance of workers’ mobility or
‘exit’ and ‘mobility-effort struggles’ in shaping labour relations. By
labour indeterminacy Smith (2006, 390) means that labour power,
i.e. the capacity to work over a given period of time or ‘what the
employer hires and the worker exchanges’, is indeterminate, first,
because the amount of effort cannot be fixed ex-ante and is subject
to bargaining at the shop floor level; second, because of labourmobil-
ity, i.e. workers’ ability to leave the job. We argue that these manifes-
tations of workers’ resistance can be as important as strikes.
As many of the new apparel factories in Ethiopia are part of
GPNs with a strong manufacturing base in Asia, the characteristics
of labour regimes can be linked to practices that ‘travel’ across the
geography of GPNs (Anner, 2020). The GPN framework has gener-
ally focused more on the processes of value creation and capture,
via structures and dynamics of power (corporate, collective, etc.),
by considering the social, network and territorial embeddedness
of actors, markets and processes (Coe & Yeung, 2015). Although
labour remains a significant gap in the GPN literature, there have
been important theoretical and empirical contributions on social
upgrading (Barrientos et al., 2011; Selwyn, 2013; Rossi, 2013),
the role of labour agency in producing geographies of labour
(Herod, 2012), workplace micro-dynamics, gender and migration
as key elements of labour dynamics within GPNs (Baglioni,
2018), and the incorporation of the aforementioned concept of
labour regime (Coe & Yeung, 2019; Taylor & Rioux, 2018).
Based on these insights, we adopt a framework that combines
three sets of categories of analysis at different scales. First is the
analysis of micro-level workplace dynamics and ‘raw’ encounters
between employers and workers over wages, productivity, safety,
effort, labour time, and mobility considering structural and associ-
ational power and drivers of mobilisation at factory level. Second,
we consider the characteristics of a particular sector or set of global
production networks, which cut across national boundaries and
generate specific imperatives of labour control. The apparel sector
has become increasingly concentrated since the phasing out of the
multi-fibre arrangement (Gereffi and Frederick, 2010). Highly con-
centrated global buyers have been able to reduce the unit prices
they pay their suppliers. At the same time, due to the dominance
of ‘fast fashion’, suppliers are expected to help lead firms reduce
the ‘time to market’. Suppliers operating in these GPNs are often
subject to a double profit and sourcing squeeze, and face pressures
to tighten mechanisms to manage work effort (Anner, 2020). They
may therefore impose methods of labour control that are harsher
and more intrusive than those in firms not subject to these
squeezes, which has implications for the incidence and nature of
labour conflict at workplace level. Thus, governments competing
to attract GPN-linked manufacturers may be compelled to create
suitable conditions for these labour control regimes (Selwyn,
2019). However, within this type of ‘global’ labour regime, varia-
tion remains possible and is shaped by ‘varieties of capital’ (Lee,
2017), particular buyer–supplier relations (Amengual et al.,
2020), government regulations and their enforcement (Anner,
2015), specific firm-level corporate ethos and management dis-
courses (Goger, 2013) and, overall, variation in labour’s social
reproduction costs alongside the specific balance of power
between capital and labour (Selwyn, 2019).
Finally, we incorporate key aspects of the state–society rela-
tions which shape labour supply dynamics and the arenas of labour
struggles, whether over the extent of commodification, the limits
to labour reproduction, or claims over representation. This ‘na-
tional political economy’ scale encompasses the institutions that
underpin these relations, including labour legislation and its
enforcement, trade unions and their power of representation,
employer organisations, and social protection systems, all critical
elements to understanding workers’ structural and associational
power and their effects on labour outcomes (Anner, 2015; Lee,
2017; Silver, 2003).
To capture these combinations of context, mechanisms and out-
comes, we draw on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data
collected in Ethiopia in 2017 and 2018. Our quantitative data
comes from survey of 531 workers across 25 apparel companies
in Ethiopia, 17 of which were foreign-owned and eight were
Ethiopian-owned. We purposively selected the most successful
enterprises in terms of employment creation, production volume
and export performance. Our sample includes leading firms both
inside and outside of the new industrial parks. Within each com-
pany we constructed a random sample of production workers,
stratified by skill group. Following our main survey in 2017 we
conducted a phone survey with 120 workers in 2018 to capture
developments in employment status and take-home pay. We also
collected firm-level data from each sampled enterprise. In parallel,
we conducted 150 in-depth qualitative interviews with managers,
workers, trade union representatives, government officials, NGO
officials, and members of international organisations.2.
1 Opportunity factors may include conditions that alter the labour-capital balance
of power, the costs of repressions, and the ongoing contestation of state power.
Admasie (2019) provides a very useful analysis of the dialectics of opportunity and
collective action in Ethiopia.
2 Throughout this paper we will refer to interview sources with a simple coding
system. The first two letters of each code indicate the profile of the respondent and
the numbers show the order of interviews (e.g. CM01). All interviews were conducted
in Ethiopia between 2017 and 2018. The letter codes have the following interpre-
tations: CM = company manager, usually factory GM or deputy manager; GO =
government official in different departments and agencies, mainly middle-to-high
level officials; TU = trade union representative, either at federal level or from factory-
level basic unions; WI = worker interview, specifically qualitative work/life histories
conducted with a sub-sample of workers extracted from the initial quantitative
survey; Oth = Other such as NGOs, or other key informants (e.g. researchers). This
system is designed to preserve the anonymity of respondents, as promised in our
consent form. Our sampling and data collection methodology is discussed in detail in
Schaefer and Oya (2019).
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3. The state, capital and labour in Ethiopia’s emerging apparel
sector
3.1. Unpacking the state
The Ethiopian state has played a central role in managing for-
eign direct investment and the subsequent interactions of foreign
firms and domestic workers. State officials, aiming to generate for-
eign exchange, create jobs, and accelerate structural transforma-
tion, have helped attract international companies involved in
leading apparel global production networks. The state has adopted
a strategy of industrial agglomeration by concentrating incoming
FDI in a series of new industrial parks.3 The most important parks
in terms of employment are the government-owned Bole Lemi and
Hawassa Industrial Parks (HIP), operational since 2015 and 2016,
respectively, and the privately-owned Eastern Industrial Park (EIP,
previously Eastern Industrial Zone), which opened in 2012. Smaller
government-owned parks opened in Mekelle and Adama in 2017
and 2018.4 In late 2018 total employment in the industrial parks
stood at around 65,000 (see Table 1), a figure which had risen to
82,000 by December 2019 (EIC, unpublished).
To understand how policy impacts the politics of production in
Ethiopia we must unpack the state institutions dealing with FDI
management, industrial development, and labour control. As part
of Ethiopia’s industrial policy, a network of government institu-
tions has taken the lead in managing FDI and industrial parks.
The Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC), the state-owned
Industrial Parks Development Corporation, the Ministry of Trade
and Industry, and the team advising the prime minister on indus-
trial policy form the apex of this structure, with the EIC acting as a
coordinating hub. Interventions feed a continuous learning pro-
cess, leading to differences in institutional design across the differ-
ent ‘generations’ of industrial parks (Oqubay & Kefale, 2020).
Labour management is, however, much less coherent. The Ministry
of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), which regulates the labour
market, plays a contradictory role: on the one hand officials seek
to avoid potential deterrents to new investors, such as the promo-
tion of trade unions, but on the other hand officials do sometimes
act to protect workers in cases of disputes.5 Regional and municipal
authorities, including the regional Bureaus of Labour and Social
Affairs (BOLSAs) play an important role in labour mobilisation:
directly, by supporting recruitment efforts in industrial parks and,
indirectly, by managing local services. These bureaus answer to
regional governments and are not directly accountable to federal
authorities. Therefore, the coordination across these levels of gov-
ernment and the contradictions that arise from differing political pri-
orities are major challenges for the industrial policy eco-system. This
coordination is made more difficult by the fragmented nature of the
Ethiopian polity, which is characterised by political conflict increas-
ingly fought along ethnic lines.
3.2. Varieties of capital
Government industrial policy has been successful in attracting
new capital from abroad. Between 2012 and 2019 nominal FDI
stocks in Ethiopia expanded from USD 5.1 billion to USD 24.9 bil-
lion (UNCTADSTAT, 2020) and by 2017 foreign firms had created
close to 100,000 jobs (Cheru & Oqubay, 2019). A significant propor-
tion of these investments originate in Asia, and Chinese investors
constitute the largest group. These investments take place within
the context of shifts in the production locations and modalities
of the global apparel sector. Large buyers in the US and EU demand
low costs and flexibility frommanufacturers, leading them to focus
on a smaller number of large-scale suppliers. In turn, the largest
suppliers have themselves become transnational corporations cap-
able of offering manufacturing-related services such as design,
logistics, and inventory management (Kumar, 2020). In search of
new spaces of low-cost production these firms are moving beyond
their production bases in Asia. Concentration among buyers and
fierce competition among manufacturers results in highly asym-
metrical power relations among firms in the value chain, even if
some of the large transnational suppliers have been able to capture
higher-value activities (Staritz, 2011).
Foreign apparel investors came into Ethiopia in three waves,
which form different varieties of private industrial capital (Staritz
& Whitfield, 2017). The first wave comprised mostly Turkish inves-
tors, who arrived before 2010 when industrial parks were not yet a
core government strategy. Most of these investors were aiming for
the domestic market. The second wave consisted of Chinese invest-
ments clustered in the EIP and again included many firms produc-
ing for the domestic market.6 The most recent wave, which began in
2014, is dominated by suppliers integrated into well-known apparel
GPNs moving to government industrial parks, such as Bole Lemi,
Mekelle and especially Hawassa. These parks were designed to
attract foreign investors and host almost no domestic companies
(Whitfield, Staritz, & Morris, 2020). Despite their particularities,
these three waves are connected because some of the first large-
scale export-oriented firms to settle acted as catalysts of subsequent
waves of investors (Lin & Xu, 2019). The domestic firms in our sam-
ple were on average much older than the foreign firms and not sited
in industrial parks.
3.3. Labour force characteristics
The apparel workforce in Ethiopia is characterised by four basic
features: most workers are young, female, have migrated inter-
nally, and have relatively high levels of education for the jobs they
fill. In our sample of 531 workers the mean age was 25 years and
75% were women. While most workers in so-called low-skilled
positions are women, especially in foreign firms, men dominate
in semi-skilled jobs. The labour force in sampled factories, espe-
cially in foreign ones, is substantially more educated than the
national average. Among so-called low-skilled workers 52.8% had
completed at least grade 10 and another 17.4% had additionally
completed a technical and vocational training (TVET) course. For
comparison, at national level, the (primary) grade-8 completion
rate was 54% in 2015/16 and gross enrolment in secondary educa-
tion barely reached 30% (Rekiso, 2019).
The other key characteristic is mobility. Persistent un- and
underemployment make labour migration a common feature in
Ethiopia. Most workers in our sample are internal migrants, and
workers in industrial parks were more likely to have migrated than
workers outside of parks. There are also differences across indus-
trial parks. For example, in the case of Hawassa, workers’ mobility
was partly induced by a government policy of far-flung catchment
areas, while in the Eastern Industrial Park most migrants came
from surrounding areas. Across the whole sample of workers, the
3 Most parks are government-owned and managed, while other parks are owned
and managed by foreign firms.
4 A map of Ethiopia’s industrial parks can be found at http://www.in-
vestethiopia.gov.et/index.php/investment-opportunities/other-sectors-of-opportu-
nity/overview.html
5 The government does not specifically set wages in parks but may provide
recommendations for base wage (minimum) floors as it seemed to be the case in
Hawassa IP. See section 4.1 below. Ultimately firms decide their own wage setting
systems, even if in some form of coordination with other companies or government
agencies in each industrial park.
6 A number of firms with initial trading ties with Ethiopia invested to take
advantage of domestic market opportunities, especially in construction materials,
while Huajian, the well-known shoemaker, acted as a pioneer among Chinese light
manufacturing investors who joined the EIP initiative. See also Chen (2019).
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majority (58%) was in their first factory job, and 46% of workers
had no formal work experience. Among workers in industrial parks
65% had no previous experience in manufacturing and 47% had no
work experience outside of the household.7
4. The politics of labour relations in a fast-moving scenario
According to the narrative put forward by the government
Ethiopia has a large pool of workers in need of stable jobs and
ready to work for ‘competitive’ wages (EIC, 2017).8 Large numbers
of eager workers were expected to flock to the gates of industrial
parks. Such an excess supply of labour would reduce workers’ struc-
tural marketplace power and limit conflict, at least in the early
stages of manufacturing growth. As in some Asian settings, manage-
rial expectations were further conditioned by racist and sexist dis-
courses concerning the supposed docility of Ethiopians in general
and of young women in particular.
However, capital-labour relations in Ethiopia’s apparel sector
have proven much more fractious than anticipated. Workers in
new manufacturing firms, particularly the ones supplying global
buyers, have used both direct and indirect forms of labour resis-
tance. Direct forms of resistance entail a confrontation with the
employer and include collective mobilisation and work stoppages.
These can be highly disruptive for manufacturers selling to global
markets, potentially giving workers substantial structural work-
place power. By contrast, indirect forms of resistance avoid collec-
tive confrontation with employers. These include ‘exit’ strategies,
i.e. workers leaving the factories or not being available for recruit-
ment. Alternatively, workers who remain may employ ‘everyday’
resistance strategies such as absenteeism, resistance to overtime,
and foot dragging, which can have a detrimental effect on produc-
tivity. These actions affect the amount of work effort over which
employers and workers bargain (Smith, 2006).
We found that these forms of collective and individual resis-
tance were common, but frequently unanticipated by foreign man-
agers. Not all firms or parks suffer in equal intensity, though. An
examination of the conditions increasing the likelihood of such
struggles reveals a complex interplay of mismatched expectations
between workers and employers and the role of local political con-
flicts. This section therefore explores the dynamics of labour rela-
tions in relation to three key themes. First are the instances of
direct labour conflict, in the form of strikes and collective action.
Here our focus is the limited role played by formal trade unions.
Second, we argue that labour relations are not simply shaped by
GPN dynamics and the import of prevailing labour regimes. The
observed patterns of labour conflict, and especially strikes, cannot
be understood without considering the interaction with political
conflict between central and regional political actors. Third, we
look at less open forms of worker resistance, in particular around
turnover, which became a serious short-term problem for many
investors.
4.1. Conflict in action: Strikes and constraints on collective
mobilisation
Collective mobilisation in the form of strikes is a common form
of labour resistance and, according to labour process theory, is par-
ticularly effective where it builds upon a combination of strong
workers’ structural and associational power (Ohlin-Wright, 2000;
Silver, 2003; Collinson & Ackroyd, 2006). However, the increasing
fragmentation of manufacturing production across developing
countries appears to have driven a ‘global quiescence’, manifested
in lower union densities and less collective action (Piazza, 2005;
Taylor & Rioux, 2018).
The recent experience of Ethiopia does not conform to this pat-
tern. Despite the scarcity of stable jobs for the vast number of peo-
ple entering the labour market every year, collective resistance by
workers is common in Ethiopian manufacturing. After a period of
25 years of relative tranquillity (Admasie, 2019), and a rapid
growth in manufacturing employment since 2015 (Cheru &
Oqubay, 2019), the incidence of strikes in the apparel industry
has increased. An ILO-led survey of 43 firms in the Ethiopian appa-
rel sector reported that 20% of firms had experienced a strike in the
previous 12 months (ILO, 2016). According to our survey data, 38%
of a sample of 531 workers reported having witnessed a strike in
their company in the 12 months prior. Strikes in apparel manufac-
turing coincided with strikes in other sectors, especially between
September 2017 and June 2018, which saw the ‘greatest wave of
labor unrest in Ethiopia since the mid-1970s’ (Admasie, 2018,
432). During the same time political tensions led to the destruction
of a number of foreign-owned factories and plantations by
protestors.
Strikes in the apparel sector were concentrated in industrial
parks and in certain politically volatile locations, such as the peri-
urban rim of Addis Ababa and the city of Hawassa. According to
our data, at companies located in industrial parks nearly 50% of
workers had witnessed a strike, while outside of the parks only
25% of workers had. There is substantial variation across industrial
parks, with the highest incidence, 65% of workers, reported among
workers in Bole Lemi and the lowest, 39% of workers, in the
Hawassa park (see Fig. 1).9 These two parks are the ones with the
highest concentration of factories producing for GPNs. After 2018,
however, the frequency of strikes declined in Bole Lemi, with most
firms finding ways of minimising unrest (CM52, Admasie, 2020).
Meanwhile, work stoppages increased in the Hawassa park, espe-
cially when a major strike erupted in March 2019 (IndustryALL,
Table 1
Overview of Ethiopian industrial parks, August 2018.
Industrial Park Ownership Sector Employment Status
Eastern Industrial Park Private Mixed 10,500 Operational since 2012
Bole Lemi I Government Textile & garments 15,000 Operational since 2015
Hawassa Phase I Government Textile & garments 24,000 Operational since 2016
Mekelle Government Textile & garments 3,800 Operational since 2017
Kombolcha Government Textile & garments 3,800 Operational since 2017
Adama Government Garment, textile & machinery 1,500 Partly operational
Huajian Industrial Park Private Mixed 4,600 Partly operational
Velocity Shoe City Private Leather products 1,700 Partly operational
Source: Unpublished data provided by the Ethiopian Investment Commission
7 See Schaefer and Oya (2019) for more statistical details on labour force
characteristics.
8 The rural population grew by 23 million between 2001 and 2014, of whom 13.1
million are of working age (EEA, 2016). Every year, thousands of new labour market
entrants join the growing labour force.
9 These data reflect the incidence of strikes among sampled workers, but they
underestimate the incidence of strikes at firm level. According to workers’ reports, all
but one of the sampled factories had seen strike action.
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2019). Variation was also remarkable within industrial parks. For
example, in the EIP, while a few firms, including the largest and most
‘visible’, were hit by waves of two or more strikes in 2017–18, most
other firms were spared. In one of the largest apparel firms operating
outside industrial parks, company managers complained that strikes
happened regularly to push for annual wage revisions (CM25). Most
of the reported labour conflict was in the form of wildcat strikes and
generally short-lived, not lasting more than a few days.
Overall, we find that low wages and wage setting systems lie at
the heart of conflict in many firms, a conclusion that confirms ear-
lier research by the ILO (2016). However, as with strike incidence,
we observe a significant difference between factories in industrial
parks and those outside. While outside of industrial parks 95% of
strikes were about wages, inside the parks, which host almost only
foreign companies, concerns such as excessive working time, low-
quality canteen food and ill-treatment of workers by supervisors
accounted for between 26% and 67% of strikes, depending on the
park.10 In the case of the Hawassa park, grievances included obstacles
to union representation, and issues of safety and harassment outside
the industrial park, with young women being particularly vulnerable
(IndustryALL, 2019; Admasie, 2020, TU03, WI01, Oth01). Wage and
non-wage grievances are of course linked, as low wages often led
to unsafe accommodation and dangerous commutes, fuelling
requests for housing near the park (GO28, TU03). According to com-
pany managers in the Bole Lemi park, grievances around living costs
in Addis Ababa and the lack of affordable housing were particularly
acute and drove some firms to consider the in-house provision of
food, accommodation and other amenities (CM52).
While monthly wages varied substantially across companies,
low wages are a common complaint by workers and trade union-
ists, and both employers and government officials frequently con-
ceded that wages levels were too low. It is hard to compare
monthly wages to ‘average’ levels in the economy, given a lack of
reliable data and substantial heterogeneity across sectors and firms.
However, we found that, in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, no
workers in our sample earned less than the $3.20 international pov-
erty line and all workers earned more than twice as much as $1.90
per day, which is the reference for poorer countries. Low-skilled
workers in our sample earned between $130 and $155 per month
in PPP terms. Reported wages were roughly in line, accounting for
inflation, with wages in flower farms, estimated at between ETB
800 and ETB 1100 in 2014 (Melese, 2015), but lower than wages
for low-skilled workers in the construction sector (Schaefer &
Oya, 2019).11 Several company managers stressed that base wages
were always ‘over’ the national poverty line (CM35, CM40).
However, international poverty lines have been criticised for
being too low to sustain dignified livelihoods (Selwyn, 2012). In
our sample, workers systematically complained that they did not
receive living wages, given rising living costs and their need to sup-
port families.12 Overall, just 27% of low-skilled workers and 41% of
semi-skilled workers stated that their earnings were sufficient to
cover monthly expenditures. Workers made up the shortfall by rely-
ing on income from other household members and going into debt.
While wage levels were reported as an issue by workers in all types
of companies, they were a particular issue in the international com-
panies sited in industrial parks.13 Our longitudinal evidence also
shows that, with the exception of Bole Lemi, wage growth inside
the parks was no faster than outside of parks between 2017 and
the end of 2018 (see Table 2). The significant rise in nominal wages
(40%) experienced in Bole Lemi appears to be related to the frequent
strikes and a shared perception among workers and employers that
living costs were rising fast in and around Addis Ababa, which led to
concessions from some of the employers (Admasie, 2020).
Wage levels reflect managerial calculations of profitability in
companies that operate within GPNs with thin profit margins.
However, interviews with both trade unions representatives and
company managers suggested that the government also played a
role by influencing wage-setting systems. At the time of the survey,
a few months after most factories in the Hawassa park had started
operations, wages there were especially low. Some of the differ-
ences may be explained by higher living costs in and around Addis
Ababa. However, the firms in the Hawassa park and the Ethiopian
government also operated a unique ‘cartel’ system that was estab-
lished to keep starting wages in Hawassa sufficiently low for firms
to commit. Factories inside the park agreed on a common base sal-
ary but discretion could be used for performance pay, thereby
allowing for limited variation in wages across factories. In the early
stages of park operations many workers reported wages that were
close to their low base salaries, leading to significant differences
with respect to other locations. In addition, government park man-
agers appear to have contributed to initial wage repression by rec-
ommending out-of-date base wage standards to newly arrived
companies. Low base benchmarks were repeatedly reported by
managers in Hawassa, where companies assumed acceptable
wages levels to be substantially lower than around Addis Ababa,
and ‘above national poverty lines’ (CM35). Government sources
suggested that officials set low benchmarks in the expectation that
additional performance-related pay would soon lead to much
higher wages (IO02, GO28).14 However, the combination of poorly
understood benchmarks, limited knowledge of context on the part
of newly arrived foreign managers, and the government’s fear of dis-
couraging investors in their quest to compete with other countries in
attracting FDI, led to wage setting systems which drove many of the
strikes and part of the high labour turnover analysed in the section
below. In the eyes of some senior managers at the park low starter
wages were justified by low productivity. As one manager put it:
‘there is no point in rewarding work if not good enough for the
demands of the industry’ (CM35). This manager, like many others,
expected rapid increases in productivity over a three- to five-year
period, from 10 to 15% to more than 60% of the global norms, leading
to higher wages via performance-based pay (CM40, CM41).15 By con-
trast, low benchmarks were not an issue in the first industrial park,
the Eastern Industrial Park, where the government did not play an
active role in organising the arrival of companies and managing
the park. In this park, operated by Chinese companies, average wages
for same jobs were significantly higher than in Bole Lemi and the
Hawassa park (see Table 1).16 These contrasts show that struggles
10 Food provision and the presence of foreign managers and supervisors was far
more common in foreign firms in industrial parks than in firms outside the parks,
increasing the potential for conflict over a wider range of issues.
11 The construction sector has grown rapidly in the past two decades on the back of
a vast infrastructure construction drive and accelerated real estate development.
Several key informants reported that firms in industrial parks had to compete with a
strong labour demand for (especially male) workers in the urban construction sector
as well as in other non-tradable services.
12 Melese (2015) estimated required living wages for a family at ETB3,367,
significantly higher than reported wages in the flower sector. This calculation
assumes a family of five with 1.6 workers per household.
13 See also Selwyn (2019) on living vs poverty wages in ‘global poverty chains’.
14 They also argued that firms should pay higher wages if they could afford them
and that benchmarks for base salaries, such as the national poverty line, were only
indicative of a minimum wage floor.
15 These factory managers suggested that low levels of time efficiency were normal
in early stages. For reference, they quoted levels of 85% in the best performing
factories in China and over 75% in Vietnam (CM41, CM36, CM52). These values are
determined by calculating operator’s efficiency in relation to a benchmark of
‘standard allowed minutes” (or standard minute value) per operation.
16 These wage comparisons are based on the workers surveys in the sampled firms
in each park. Firms in the EIP sample were primarily export-oriented and GPN-linked
with the exception of one textile company. Therefore, they are comparable to other
GPN-linked firms in Bole Lemi and Hawassa. The main difference, apart from
nationality of ownership, was the years of operation in the country, i.e. longer in the
case of EIP firms.
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over wages and workers’ effort need to consider the contingent role
of actors external to the factory floor.
Collective action in the contemporary Ethiopian apparel sector
is largely organised outside of formal union structures. Strikes in
the sector were generally wildcat strikes. Officials from the Confed-
eration of Ethiopian Trade Unions, the main trade union body in
the country, acknowledged that most strikes were ‘unorganised’
in that they happened in factories without union representation.
There were some reports of wildcat strikes even in firms with a
basic union in place (TU03). This is not a new phenomenon. The
history of labour conflict in Ethiopia since the end of World War
II is marked by recurrent wildcat strikes, even when unions
existed, partly because the labour law makes legal strikes difficult
(Admasie, 2019).
Contemporary wildcat strikes are driven both by legal impedi-
ments to union-organised strikes and by the low trade union den-
sity in Ethiopian manufacturing in general, and in industrial parks
in particular. An ILO study found gross trade union density in 2010,
i.e. before the establishment of the main industrial parks, was
around 15% and less than 1% of wage workers were covered by a
collective bargaining agreement (ILO, 2016).17 Trade union data
show more than 60% of firms in the sector did not have any union
presence and most workers were not union members (TU03, CCOO
Industria, 2018; Admasie, 2020).
As in many other countries, larger firms are more likely to have
a basic union. Among the larger firms in the sector, foreign firms
were much less likely to allow trade unions to form than Ethiopian
companies, at least initially. The aforementioned ILO (2016) report
found that foreign investors seemed especially resistant to union
presence in their factories.18 Our survey confirmed that most of
the foreign firms in industrial parks have no formal trade union pres-
ence (see Figure 1 above). Trade unions have de facto (though not de
jure) been discouraged in the three largest parks. Several union rep-
resentatives reported that there was active discouragement of
unions by government institutions, a fact corroborated by other
reports (Admasie, 2020; ILO, 2017). This is again not new in Ethiopia,
where historically the relationship between organized labour and
the state has often been fractious, and labour has been particularly
militant in apparel companies (Admasie, 2018, 2020).19 According
to our interviews with trade unionists, the EIC opted for a hands-
off approach to labour matters, whereas the MOLSA and BOLSAs
seemed reluctant to take the part of workers in cases of conflict
unless management misbehaviour was clear-cut.
Different degrees of government discouragement across parks
partly explain variation in trade union presence. The perceived dis-
couragement was particularly strong in the government-owned
Hawassa industrial park (TU04). Here the collective preference of
companymanagers was to avoid formal trade union representation
and instead operate with more artificial and undemocratic organi-
Fig. 1. Union presence and strike action by industrial park, 2017. Source: Own Survey, 2017.
Table 2
Development of estimated mean take-home wages by industrial park, 2017–2018.
Industrial Park Mean monthly
wage (ETB) 2017
Standard error Mean monthly
Wage (ETB) 2018






Not in park 1,478 30.2 1,790 124.2 21% 64 192
Bole Lemi 1,197 45.1 1,675 180.6 40% 60 180
EIZ 1,365 38.1 1,685 175.4 23% 61 181
Hawassa 1,033 14.0 1241 56.3 20% 45 133
Note: 2018 USD wages were converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) using the 2017 World Bank’s conversion factor for Ethiopian private consumption.
Source: Own surveys, 2017 and 2018.
17 According to representatives of the main textile and garment trade union in 2017
and 2018 the proliferation of many small and ‘poor’ enterprises means that trade
union density and especially collective bargaining generally remain low in this sector
(TU03).
18 However, trade union representatives at Ethiopian-owned firms also consistently
reported that despite the presence of a trade union collective bargaining agreements
were not adhered to.
19 Admasie (2019) in dialogue with Kelly’s framework, suggests that labour conflict
in Ethiopia has followed a series of cycles since the 1960s. These ‘proletarian
insurgencies’ in the late 1960s, early 70s, then early 1990s, were followed by periods
of calm, partly driven by repression and partly by consent, depending on the
configuration of organised labour and the relationship between trade unions and the
state. The recent wave of strikes documented in this article can be viewed as part of
this long history of labour mobilisation in the country.
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sational forms such as workers’ councils. Such joint worker-
management committees are common in the apparel sector, but
tend to have a limited mandate, often focused on health and safety
issues (ILO, 2016).20 Moreover, according to interviews with factory-
level union representatives such joint committees, along with some
of the basic union structures, were dominated by management per-
sonnel from human resources departments, particularly in foreign
owned firms (TU06, WI02). Workers’ councils organised by senior
management without involving trade unions reflect a combination
of two of the four dominant patterns of work practices in developed
countries according to the classification proposed by Katz (2006), i.e.
a ‘low wage’ managerial archetype and the HRM model. Anti-union
animus prevails in the former while the latter is characterised by
union substitution of the kind observed in the Hawassa park.
The preference for union substitution in the Hawassa park
reflected negative perceptions of trade unions shared by foreign
investors and the government agencies managing the park. Man-
agerial bargaining leverage is often enhanced when alternative
production sites are perceived to pose a threat to the scaling up
or even the continuation of an investment. In Ethiopia, the govern-
ment seemed particularly sensitive to the mobility of capital and
eager to demonstrate that conflict could be managed, as shown
in interviews with MOLSA. In this regard, the government’s stance
vis-à-vis trade unions has contributed to a predominance of ‘low
wage’ workplace patterns with hierarchical work relations and sig-
nificant managerial discretion over working conditions. These, in
turn, fuel grievances and perceptions of injustice that can result
in unorganised strikes, as suggested by labour mobilisation theory.
Finally, how strikes were resolved also tells us much about the
shifting politics of labour relations. In the initial stages, a common
managerial tactic, especially in non-unionised firms, was to fire
organisers, a practice that is against the labour law. This is a com-
mon method to counterbalance collective action and demobilise
workers (Kelly, 1998). The narrative was two-fold. Some managers
argued that workers only took action due to the intervention of a
minority of ‘trouble-makers’, implying that grievances were not
widespread (CM27). This is clearly not true considering the ample
evidence of complaints. The second justification was that the ‘insti-
gators’ were in fact political mobilisers using factory workers to
further their political agendas (CM63). We will come back to this
issue below.
Less belligerent firms attempted to appease workers by review-
ing their management procedures to better respond to grievances.
For example, some managers in Chinese firms argued that well-
trained managerial staff was key to successfully managing a restive
labour force. They also admitted problems in transmitting the cor-
porate culture of the firm to workers, and an excessive tendency to
attribute problems to a ‘lack of work ethic’ (CM51, CM63). Better
trained staff would be more able to communicate productivity
imperatives and organise a labour force with different levels of effi-
ciency. Managing such differences was seen as critical to improv-
ing workers’ attitude to production targets and avoiding
widespread discontent.
At the same time there is a growing divergence of attitudes
towards unions among foreign firms. For instance, in Bole Lemi
and the Eastern Industrial Park firms were initially openly opposed
to trade unions, as managers associated unions with more labour
conflict. Over time, managers at a small number of firms realized
that having adequate worker’s representation may help them
respond to labour conflicts, a point often repeated by union leaders
(Admasie, 2020). One of the pioneering firms in accepting formal
union representation in Bole Lemi indeed suffered no labour con-
flict thereafter and other factories in the same park took note
(CM44). Similarly, the CEO of one of the largest factories in the sec-
tor reported a succession of wildcat strikes and decried the diffi-
culty in finding consistent interlocutors on the side of workers,
as each strike came with different representatives (CM27, CM51).
This factory eventually called in the sectoral trade union to estab-
lish a basic union, but spontaneous mobilisations continued to
flare up, especially in connection to local protests. In short, despite
initial animosity, some factory managers were able to shift prac-
tices and view unions as part of the solution to labour grievances.
Their changes in attitude were not directly linked to being part of a
particular GPN, but rather to the micro-level dynamics of conflict
management and the variation in the incidence of such conflicts.
4.2. Local political conflicts and their impact on labour relations
It is tempting to read all instances of labour conflict as evidence
of class conflict between capital and labour. However, the antago-
nistic capital-labour relation does not necessarily generate con-
flictual behaviour (Kelly 1998). In Ethiopia, the interpretation of
drivers of labour conflict is complicated by the fact that the recent
acceleration of strikes coincided with a tumultuous period of polit-
ical tensions and protests that began in 2014 and escalated further
in 2016 (see Fisher & Gebrewahd, 2019 for an overview).21 We
must stress that our own research, along with other studies, finds
a host of genuine labour grievances and, in many instances, these
are clear drivers of conflict. However, it is difficult to disentangle
the role played by opposition politics in some parts of the Oromia
and SNNP regions of Ethiopia, where three of the sampled industrial
parks are located. These areas saw widespread protests against the
federal government, with protesters demanding greater political
rights and the administrative recognition of regional and sub-
regional identities.
Two clear examples of this articulation between labour grie-
vances and local political conflicts are the wildcat strikes that
occurred in Bole Lemi Industrial Park in 2018 and in the Hawassa
Industrial Park in 2019. Workers in Bole Lemi went on strike for
five days in May 2018. While these strikes were nominally about
wages levels and other labour-related issues they occurred in the
context of sustained uprisings against the federal government dri-
ven by grievances about the political representation of the Oromo
ethnic group. The unrest provided additional motivation to work-
ers and made striking easier, as widespread demonstrations had
weakened the ability of state security forces to intervene
(Admasie, 2018). At least some of the workers saw the strike as
directly political. One worker reported that factory gates were
blocked by workers from Oromia who proclaimed that ‘‘we cannot
continue working in the situation that our brothers and sisters are
being killed by armed forces” (WI03). In 2019, workers in the
Hawassa Industrial park went on strike twice, in March and again
in July. As in Bole Lemi these strikes were fuelled by both labour
grievances and wider political struggles, in this case around the
issue of statehood for the Sidama area which surrounds the city
of Hawassa. Beginning in the 1970s, residents of Sidama have led
a long campaign seeking to have their area recognised as its own
region within the Ethiopian federal state. Their campaign was fre-
quently met with violent suppression by the central state which
helps explain the ferocity of the more recent clashes. The conflict
led to violent demonstrations in 2018 and again in July 2019 after
activists threatened to unilaterally declare an independent regional
state (Tronvoll et al., 2020). While the strike in March 2019 was
triggered by working conditions (IndustryALL, 2018), the strike in
20 These are also well-known labour control mechanisms as suggested by the
industrial relations literature (Collinson & Ackroyd, 2006).
21 There are historical precedents of links between industrial contention and
political strife such as the period 1974–76 (Admasie, 2019, 96).
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July was preceded by large number of workers in the Hawassa Park
wearing t-shirts displaying a symbol of Sidama statehood
(Astatike, 2019).
Large foreign flagship firms, which have a high public profile,
were particularly targeted by strikes.22 Wages and working condi-
tions were not generally worse in these firms. For instance, a partic-
ular factory that suffered a number of strikes in recent years offered
the highest wages in its industrial park (CM27 and own survey
results). Two factors are behind this targeting of high-visibility
enterprises. On the one hand, workers in such firms have a greater
incentive to strike, as they can expect that such companies will be
keen to avoid reputational damage. On the other hand, this targeting
reflects the interests of local political actors. Some company man-
agers in parks in the affected areas reported that their informants
linked several wildcat strikes to local opposition groups pushing
workers to strike as part of the political mobilisation against the fed-
eral government (CM51) and suggested that high-profile factories
were seen as strategic targets to boost the visibility of protests.
The claim was that while grievances had previously been resolved
on an individual basis or with small groups of workers, once political
protests erupted factories witnessed an escalation of strikes (CM50).
Some of the strikes in 2018-19 spared medium-sized factories and
instead focused on the largest factories inside the parks, especially
in the Eastern Industrial Park (CM51). The presence of flagship firms
and their importance to the Ethiopian government, which is eager to
use them as catalysts of more FDI, are a contingent opportunity fac-
tor in Kelly’s (1998) framework and, given the potential vulnerability
of these firms, enhance workers’ structural power.
Many companies failed to anticipate these political develop-
ments. Ethiopia had been perceived, perhaps naively, as a haven
of comparative political stability. Suddenly, foreign capitalists
found themselves in a political climate at odds with their image
of a strong state friendly to overseas investors. Over time, a stark
contrast emerged between the views of some company managers,
who claimed that state institutions, especially at local level, usually
took the side of workers, and the perceptions of trade unionists,
who reported facing an alliance between the central state and for-
eign investors, especially those situated in industrial parks. Indeed,
during some strikes and local protests spilling into industrial parks,
armed federal police and even military units were deployed to pro-
tect factories (CM25, CM50). These divergent perceptions reflect
the complexity of centre-periphery relations within the Ethiopian
state (Clapham, 2018; Markakis, 2013), where local-level actions
may not be aligned with federal institutions. For example, accord-
ing to several foreign companymanagers (CM53), the regional Oro-
mia BOLSA became much less investor-friendly. This change in
attitude was reflected in greater support for workers’ grievances,
and fewer (or slower) interventions in strikes and protests affect-
ing factories. Many factory managers also complained about the
‘bias’ in local courts, which apparently routinely ruled in favour
of workers.23 This dynamic reflected the perception that industrial
parks were ‘federal government projects’ that had been imposed
on regional and local governments without sufficient consultation
(GO30).
Several foreign investors seemed confused as to whether the
state was ‘on their side’ or not. An important implication is that
employers, especially newly arrived foreign investors, are not gen-
erally sufficiently tuned into the complexities of national and local
politics. Understanding and anticipating these developments and
the possible effects on their operations might have helped reduce
labour conflict. The troubles facing many of the most affected for-
eign firms reflect missing organizational capabilities, in the sense
of contextual knowledge and the relationships needed to organise
collective activities in unfamiliar social and political contexts
(Khan, 2019).
The complex interaction of labour grievances, low union den-
sity, national- and local-level politics, and fragmented state-
capital and state-labour relations has contributed to uneven man-
ifestations of open labour conflict, despite shared grievances. This
evidence underscores the need to account for multiple dimensions
of the politics of production, and the variety of factors that under-
pin labour mobilisation, with the opportunity factor of localised
political conflict being a key contributor in this recent wave of
wildcat strikes.
4.3. A plentiful pool of disciplined labour? Struggles over effort and
mobility
The history of industrial capitalism is marked by repeated strug-
gles over the content of the labour process, work effort, and the
extent of managerial control over workers. The imposition of strict
factory discipline has frequently generated conflicts between work-
ers and managers, and the regulation of work effort has been a cen-
tral concern of labour movements since their inception (Kocka,
2014). In industrialised countries despotic labour regimes slowly
gave way to manufacturing consent (Burawoy, 1985). However,
struggles over work intensity and work time remain unresolved in
most high-income economies (McGovern, 2020), and in contempo-
rary low-income countries effective labour standards face additional
structural barriers, including the unwillingness of many lead firms to
pay for improved working conditions (Frenkel, 2018).
Ethiopia is no exception to these struggles over work effort. Our
survey data shows that the labour process in all factories was con-
trolled using daily production targets. About 75% of workers were
set individual targets. Production targets were demanding and
around 30% of workers report regularly failing to meet targets. Work
effort is ensured through close supervision by line managers. Abusive
behaviour by managers and line supervisors was a common com-
plaint among workers in foreign firms. According to our survey data
53% of workers in foreign firms have witnessed superiors verbally
abusing workers, while 38% report having been subjected to such
abuse themselves. A frequently expressed sentiment in qualitative
interviews was that workers did not feel treated with dignity.
While the labour process literature has rightly devoted much
attention to formal conflict and bargaining, forms of non-
organised resistance by individual workers can have at least as
great an impact on labour relations as strikes. Such resistance
can take a wide range of forms (Collinson & Ackroyd, 2006). Sabo-
tage, theft, work limitation such as refusing to accept overtime,
absenteeism, time-wasting and discursive opposition to ‘manage-
ment speak’ are all everyday forms of resistance at the workplace
(Smith, 2006). Although the incidence of strikes in Ethiopia is sig-
nificant, ‘exit’ is a far more widespread form of resistance. In our
sample of workers, the three most common forms of resistance
were turnover (i.e. workers leaving the factory), absenteeism, and
withholding of work effort, including reluctance to do overtime.
Overtime is common in the garment industries of Asia (Alamgir
& Banerjee, 2019; Anner, 2020; Oka, 2016), but in our sample
28% of workers report never having done overtime work.
A common complaint among foreign managers was that these
forms of resistance were far more disruptive (and therefore effec-
tive from the workers’ point of view) than strikes. These forms of
resistance all affect firms’ competitiveness and even engender
the risk of being cut out of global production networks if orders
are consistently missed. High turnover affected both the domestic
and the foreign firms in our sample but was a much more serious
22 These included high-profile companies located outside industrial parks which
were severely hit by waves of strikes first and then local riots linked to political
mobilisations.
23 They, however, also complained about the rigidity of the labour law, implicitly
acknowledging that courts were simply applying the law.
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concern in foreign firms, as evidenced by interviews with man-
agers.24 Some factors driving turnover, such as low wages and
unmet expectations on the part of workers, are shared by foreign
and domestic firms, but the latter have had more time to develop
methods for stabilising the labour force and have greater freedom
to do so as they face less stringent pressures from their buyers.
According to union officials and workers, high rates of absen-
teeism and turnover are direct responses to low wages. Despite a
shared view among managers and government officials that turn-
over rates represented a significant obstacle to industrial develop-
ment in Ethiopia, data are contradictory and it is hard to obtain
consistent estimates of monthly turnover rates. One company in
the Hawassa park reported a 6% monthly turnover rate compared
to only 1% annual turnover in their Chinese factories. Monthly
turnover rates in 2018 could be as high as 15% in many factories
in other parks (CCOO Industria, 2018). We conducted a longitudi-
nal analysis of employment trajectories for a sample of 120 apparel
workers with an interval between surveys of 12 to 16 months. We
found that 41% of workers were no longer in their original jobs.25
While all industrial parks experience similar levels of turnover, there
is substantial variation at the level of the firm, suggesting that turn-
over is related to the issues in each particular factory, and not simply
linked to a particular GPN. Whether turnover persists, according to
several managers, is mostly linked to the company’s failure to exam-
ine the causes and implement corrective measures. Our longitudinal
evidence suggests that the primary cause of workers changing jobs
was the search for higher wages.26 Another common source of frus-
tration, according to interviews with workers and union representa-
tives, was the lack of understanding of wage setting systems on the
part of workers, which led to perceptions of unfairness. This was
especially the case in newly established industrial parks like
Hawassa and for workers in their first factory job. The complexity
of bonus systems, deductions, and other variations in take-home
pay left many workers disgruntled because their expectation of a
stable wage was not met. Wages were not just low and variable,
but also insufficient to fund the lifestyles workers expected. A salary
high enough to save money and support their families seemed dis-
tant for many of the new factory workers (Schaefer & Oya, 2019).
In the words of a senior manager in the Hawassa park ‘workers’
expectations were unrealistic partly because of a lack of previous
experience, and partly because of misleading word of mouth sug-
gesting salaries would be higher’ (CM34). Moreover, turnover and
absenteeism were compounded by difficulties in sourcing enough
workers, according to a report on the Hawassa park. The gap
between factory requests for workers and candidates channelled
through the park’s labour sourcing system widened between 2017
and 2018, leading to unexpected labour shortages for some factories
(Butler, 2018). Unmet expectations thus contributed to the ‘exit’ (or
no entry) option for poorly organised and inexperienced employees,
who did not regard the exercise of ‘voice’ as a realistic option.
However, high turnover rates were not uncommon in early
stages of similar investments in other countries (Oya, 2019).27
Some managers reported having faced comparable rates in their
operations in Southeast Asia, illustrating the frictions that accom-
pany processes of transition to industrial work (CM41). The most
experienced suppliers in GPNs seemed the least concerned by the
evidence of high turnover (CM41, CM34). Their expectation was that,
after one or two years, worker turnover would stabilise and eventu-
ally decline as the firm was able to retain the best workers.28 To a
certain extent, as suggested by the literature on low-wage classic
labour regimes (Smith, 2006), high turnover may be tolerable from
a managerial perspective if it leads to the most productive workers
remaining in the job. For some firms, high turnover in occupations
requiring basic skills may even be a strategy to reduce workers’
potential for collective action. This may explain why many globally
integrated firms in Ethiopia confronted this problemwithout making
significant concessions to workers (Hardy & Hauge, 2019).
This does not mean that there were no gains for workers. As
reported above, changes in attitudes towards unions in some com-
panies led to increased union representation. A number of Chinese
firms also provided better meals and improved hygiene standards
in response to strikes (CM27, CM60, CM63). Yet, there is only pat-
chy evidence on gains in relation to wages. In some flagship com-
panies, periodic strikes eventually led to wage gains, but this was
not a widespread phenomenon, hence the variation in wage
increases across parks and even among firms within the same park
(Table 2, CM25, CM52). In 2019, the Ethiopian government issued a
new labour proclamation which included provisions for a commis-
sion to decide upon minimumwages, but so far no minimumwage
has been set (ILO, 2019).29
There seems to be more consensus on the need to tackle the
challenges of housing and commuting costs. A number of firms
in our sample attempted to reduce living costs through subsidising
transport to the factories and were considering options for provid-
ing housing. Bole Lemi and especially the Hawassa Park were also
the object of feasibility studies and government-business discus-
sions on housing solutions (CM52, CM35, CM34, GO29). At the time
of research, in 2018, there was growing, but not uniform, accep-
tance of the idea of investing in workers’ accommodation to reduce
commuting and subsidise housing costs for workers (CM52, CM35,
CM57).30 Since then, according to high-level officials, land adjacent
to industrial parks has been made available for firms to build work-
ers’ accommodation.31 In addition, the government and state finan-
cial institutions promoted housing development by property owners,
to offer workers affordable rental accommodation (GO29, GO30).32
Thus, the approach is to induce private-led solutions rather than to
directly intervene in housing provision, primarily due to the govern-
ment’s limited financial capacity to undertake such endeavours.33
The effectiveness of these measures is yet to be determined as there
has been very limited construction until now (GO30). However, the
fact that a significant debate on labour grievances has ensued and
24 While high turnover has been identified as concern in domestic firms before
(Hardy & Hauge, 2019), our survey data show that workers in domestic firms on
average have much longer tenure and receive higher wages than in foreign firms
(Schaefer & Oya, 2019).
25 This includes workers who moved to other factories in the same sector and those
who left the sector altogether.
26 As noted before, in areas surrounding the parks, male workers can find better paid
jobs in construction and transport services and some women may find better paid
jobs in services. However, for young women a key reason is that factory jobs were a
steppingstone towards far more lucrative jobs as domestic workers in the Middle East
(Schewel & Fransen 2018).
27 See remarkably similar stories and challenges in the cases of Cambodia (Derks,
2008), Bangladesh (Kibria, 1998) and Malaysia (Ong, 1987).
28 Anecdotal evidence from recent conversations with factory managers in Hawassa
suggest that by 2020 the turnover problem was significantly less acute than in the
early stages of operation.
29 The new labour legislation has also introduced some gains for employers, notably
more flexibility in overtime use, extended probation periods and simplification of
rules for redundancy.
30 Few companies were reluctant to associate their brand to workers’ accommoda-
tion given potential reputational damage (CM35). Thus, they had a strong preference
for the local or federal government to own these initiatives.
31 Projects are overseen by the Industrial Park Development Corporation to ensure
they confirm to ILO standards and are affordable for workers. Several government
officials are adamant to avoid ‘factory dormitories’ of the kind found in parts of China
to house migrant workers. See Pun and Smith (2007) on the dormitory labour regime
in China.
32 Some of these initiatives in Hawassa have been further developed through the
Hawassa Sustainable Urban Development Partners’ Platform (ILO, 2020).
33 An EIC document (2020) recognises that the incorporation of workers’ housing
was a planned part of the industrial park programme but limited finances left this
aspect out of the final development of the parks.
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that both companies and the government have articulated some
responses suggests that labour mobilization and resistance may
eventually pay off even in these early stages of industrial
development.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the dynamics of industrial labour rela-
tions during the process of setting up newmanufacturing locations
serving global production networks in a low-income country, using
the example of the Ethiopian apparel sector. The worldwide
restructuring of production networks by lead firms in the sector
and a proactive space-based industrial policy programme in Ethio-
pia have combined to entice suppliers of leading apparel GPNs to
set up factories in a series of new industrial parks. Both investors
and the Ethiopian government expected to find a pliant labour
force willing to work for low wages. However, they underesti-
mated the extent to which new labour regimes, which are neces-
sary for the profitable insertion into demanding GPNs, are co-
constituted and contested by workers. The new sector has already
seen a wave of collective and individual resistance from workers,
driven in part by grievances over wages and non-wage working
conditions. Part of the problem lies in crude characterisations of
labour regimes and what they miss: the historical militancy of
workers in the sector, the role of opportunity factors, and the
resulting variety of drivers of labour conflict (and hence contin-
gency of actions). We have argued that the best way to understand
how certain forms of labour agency are produced, and the impacts
they have on workers and firms, is via a combination of analytical
categories from labour process theory, mobilisation theory and
GPN analysis, in order to capture developments at the level of
the country, the sector and the firm. National governments fre-
quently play a contradictory role in regulating labour markets
and working conditions as they seek to maintain inflows of FDI
while not excessively undermining their own political legitimacy
(Smith et al., 2018). Firms, in turn, differ in their target markets,
business experience in different contexts, and conditions of inte-
gration into global production networks.
Our analysis uncovered widespread ‘informal’ resistance to low
wages and strenuous working conditions on the part of workers.
This activism comprises a variety of forms, from large-scale collec-
tive action, in particular wildcat strikes, to individual struggles
over work effort and mobility, resulting in absenteeism and high
turnover. Industrial parks emerged as spaces of particularly intense
contestation. Many conflicts result from the collision of productiv-
ity imperatives on the part of firms tied into demanding, but badly
remunerated, segments of global production networks with the
expectations of workers with limited prior experience in industry,
who assumed international firms would pay better. Conflicts were
sharpened by the suppression of trade union activity in many, but
not all, industrial parks and firms, which drove workers to organise
outside of union structures and hampered industrial dialogue. The
prevailing opinion among government officials and foreign man-
agers, that democratically organised unions could be substituted
for by less democratic organisational forms with more limited
mandates such as workers’ councils, is no longer shared by all firms
and some have allowed the formation of union branches in their
premises. Individual resistance by workers unused to the intense
discipline and submission to the demands of the production pro-
cesses expected of factory workers frequently took the form of exit.
Disgruntled workers would leave the sector altogether, while
others would seek to move employer in search of better wages
and working conditions. The government reacted by putting in
place programmes to help recruitment by assisting with the sour-
cing and screening of workers. However, in some cases even this
labour sourcing was insufficient, resulting in challenges for some
newly establish factories to meet their increasing labour require-
ments. The gains resulting from the various manifestations of
labour resistance have been so far limited and not systematic,
but there is evidence that workers’ ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ can contribute
to improvements in employment outcomes.
Crucially, our approach has highlighted the importance of tak-
ing into account local political conflicts when analysing drivers of
labour resistance. In Ethiopia, industrial strife resulted from a com-
plex interplay of factory-based grievances and political mobilisa-
tion against the national government. Local political actors
sought to capitalise on existing grievances of workers by targeting
prominent foreign factories; a political strategy made feasible by
the close identification of the national government with FDI-
driven industrialisation and the construction of the new industrial
parks. The result are fleeting, unstable, and highly localised politics
of production that are structured, but not determined, by the
dynamics of global production networks and the strategic aims
of national political actors.
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